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T hk阿e句go附V刊ernm町…e叩n O山fcωc∞om刷p仰阿u叫向l
u凶I凶secontrol power路'Sappears to be increasing world-
w叩id白ea槌scompetition f白oru凶I瓜sea油bleand livable s叩paceincreases. 
The need for large and relatively undeveloped space for ag-
riculture and conservation purposes often competes with the 
need for shelter and the commercial and industrial develop-
ment accompanying such development for employment， 
product production and distribution， and other largely urban 
uses. The free market does not always-some would say of-
ten-result in a logical and equitable distribution of land 
凶 esand attendant public facilities necessary to serve the 
use ofland. One function of government is therefore to regu-
late the use of pri vate land for the health， safety， and welfare 
ofi岱 citizens，and to help provide roads， water， sanitation， 
andotherpublic facilities， aswell as schools， parks， ai中orts，
and the like. Accomplishing恥 former-regulation-is
generally done in accordance with some form or level of 
plan. Accomplishing the latter often requires the exercise 
of compulsory purchase powers， providing public land or 
interests in land in order to construct such public facilities 
or infrastructure. 
The Asia-Pacific region and its rapid urbanization has 
generated a need for both land use control and use of com-
pulsory purchase powers. The same rapid urbanization and 
the need for accompanying public facilities has generated 
areawide interest in the mechanics (rather than the theory) 
of compulsory purchase and related land use control mecha-
nisms. While there are certain commonalities among the 1 
coun出esthat form the basis of our comparati ve study， there 
are differences as well， some of them (such as the ratio of 
public and private land ownership) fundamental. The pur-
pose of our study was to summarize the principal compul-
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sory purchase and land use control systems in the 1 coun-
tries that make up the basis of our comparative study， and to 
attempt to draw some parallels and note some differences 
among them. However， any comparative study of law and 
administrative practice is bound to be somewhat general if 
truly comparative. Our study was no exception. 
What follows in the next part are the major themes that 
emerged from our study. The practices of the individual 
countries of the study are then summarized， with explana・
tion and analysis ofthe laws applicable to compulsory pur-
chase and land use control in each coun町.
Major Themes 
Land Use Control 
Virtually every country studied has some mechanism for the 
control ofprivate land use， particularly those uses most of-
ten associated with urbanization: residential， commercial， 
industrial， and institutional凶 esofland. These mechanisms 
range from the relatively detailed to the relatively 
broad-brush. What follows is a summary of the major 
themes that emerge企omexamining each Asia-Pacific 
coun町'sconcepts of land use and planning. 
Ownership of Land 
There is some private ownership ofland or rights in land in 
most of the countries studied. In countries like the United 
S tates， most developable land， and virtually allland in urban 
areas， is privately owned. Much the same is汀ueinNewZea-
land and Australia. However， ina significant number of 
countries-China， Hong Kong， Malaysia， and Singa-
pore-the state owns virtually al of the land， though in 
Hong Kong and its administrative region， it is theoretically 
possible for a citizen to acquire the equivalent of a fee sim-
ple interest in government land through adverse possession 
over a 60ヴearperiod. There is no record of anyone having 
ever done so， however. This has considerable implications 
for the regulation of land use. In those states where the state 
owns most ofthe land， private development takes place al・
most exclusively on leased land with the government as les-
so工 Thelease provides an added-sometimes the princi司
pal-method of control through lease covenants， often of a 
sophisticated na同re，as in Hong Kong. Indeed， in China， 
Hong Kong， and Singapore， the government retains the 
power to unilaterally modi命theterms of the lease， and in 
Hong Kong， a lessee 's increased use ofleased land requires 
the payment of a premium to the government-lessor. 
10-2001 NEWS & ANALYSIS 31 ELR 11185 
Statutory Framework 
The majority of the countries studied provide for land use 
controls through a national statute that either imposes a rnin-
imum level of land use control or sets out a framework for 
regional and local control， or bo血 Indeed，only the United 
States appears to be virtually silent on nationalland use pol-
icy respecting the private use ofland， although virtually ev-
ery state has an enabling act that perrnits localland use con-
trols through zoning. This， of co町田，may be due principally 
to the federal nature ofthe United States， where most pow-
ers of an internal nature reside with the states rather than 
with the national government， coupled with the country's 
comparatively large land mass (only Australia and China 
are comparable in this sense) and historic distrust of1and use 
control in al but urban areas. Japan is a typical example of a 
coun町 withnationallegislation that both sets policy and 
provides minimum standards. Most urban areas are required 
to undertake a rninimum level of land use control. Each is 
further required to use roughly the same dozen use zones in 
regulating land use. Most， like Taiwan， further require con-
sistency， more or less top-down， among national， regional， 
and localland use regulatory schemes， with the national set-
ting broad policy and the local implementing it at the con-
struction and development level. 
Plans and Planning 
Virtually every country integrates some sort of land use 
planning into the control of land use and development. 
Some， like Japan and Thai1and， have national plans. Other民
like the United States， have mainly local plans where there is 
often only the most rudimentary of plans even at the local 
level. Stil others， like Australia， exercise the planning func-
tion at the state or regional level. Most coun仕iesrequire 
conformance with血eappropriate level of plan document， 
and further require the compliance ofthe next governmental 
tier down with the plan immediately above. Thus， Taiwan's 
three-tiered planning system begins with the national， flows 
to the regional， and then to the local， with the higher tier 
guiding the lower one. 
Zoning 
In a majority ofthe coun住iesstudied， the implementation of 
land use controls comes at the locallevel， through some sort 
of zoning. Hong Kong， Japan， Korea， and Taiwan make it 
clear that such zoning must conform to the applicable-usu-
ally local-plan or planning document. The same is回 e
with respect to most U.S. states through either court deci-
sion or zoning enabling act， though conformance with plans， 
if any， is often more honored in the breach. Typically such 
zoning divides the jurisdiction of a local government into 
various residential， commerciallbusiness and industrial 
zones， sometimes with open space， agricultural， and insti佃ー
tional zones as well. The凶 esperr凶ttedin each zone are 
found in a local (sometimes guided by national， asin Japan) 
zoning ordinance， resolution， or rule， together with a pro・
cess， ifany， for changing the zones upon petition ofthe land-
owner/lessee/user of a parcel within a particular zone. In 
some of the coun岡田 studied-suchas Japan and Ko-
rea-the national government imposes a standard set of 
zo凶ngdistricts on alllocal governments. In others-like the 
United States-the choice of dis出ωrernainsin the discre-
tion oflocal governments， which may choose not to zone 
at all. 
Building Regulations 
A surprising number of coun甘ies-Japan，Korea， and Tai-
wan-regulate buildings as well as land use by means of 
a national statute. In others-such as the United 
States-building codes are the most localized of1and devel-
opment controls. 
Courts and Common Law 
The United States appears to be alone in its reliance on vast 
numbers of cases in出eshaping of the land use regulatory 
framework， aIthough a few also appear in Aus釘ヨlia，Hong 
Kong， and Singapore. This may be due largely to the com-
mon-law仕aditionsin these countries， together with the his-
tory of private rights to develop land， whether through 
leasehold or fee simple ownership. 
“Regulatory" Taking 
In the United States， since 1922 at least， a town planning or 
land use regulation that goes “too far" may be treated by 
courts the same as a physical taking or compulsory pur-
chase. Usually to be so回 ated，the landowner must have 
been deprived by regulations of al econornically beneficial 
use ofthe subject parcel of1and. Sirnilar“regulatory taking" 
theories appear in Japan and Korea. In Japan， where a town 
planning zone designation“takes" al future use and re-
quires cessation of existing uses， the landowner is entitled to 
compensation. In Korea， a designation that prevents al con-
struction sirnilar1y requires landowner compensation. 
Indigenous Peoples 
The accommodation of indigenous peoples， their rights， and 
traditional practices often clash with town planning and 
land use regulatory schemes that are directed prirnarily at 
land development issues. In particular， Australia and New 
Zealand are dealing with this emerging land use issue. 
Colonial Heritage 
The land use planning schemes of rnany coun甘iesare rooted 
in colonial practices imported from outside the country. 
This sometimes results in an over1ay of outside influence 
over仕aditionalnotions ofproperty， particular1y ifthe basic 
real property law ofthe country rernains rooted in its pre-co・
lonial history. Aus仕alia，Korea， New Zealand， Singapore， 
and the United States are examples of countries dealing with 
some of these issues. 
Common Problems 
Principal among the problerns that commonly arise under 
the various land use planning and control systerns is en-
forcement. The pace of development has been swift in many 
Asian countries and violation of planning policy and regula-
tion is common， particular1y in Taiwan and Thailand. Often 
there is a concomitant loss of open space and agric凶阻ral
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land to more urban forms of development，価reportedin Ko・
rea and Thailand. On the surface， there appear to be less en-
forcement problems in Japan， Singapore， and the United 
States. Australia has two methods of enforcement: its mu-
nicipal councils criminally prosecute breaches， and any per-
son can bring a civil case against another. There is also a 
problem with meaningful public participation in the process 
reported in Taiwan and Thailand. 
Eminent Domain 
Every country in the study claims the right of government to 
take orreclaim private property. Without such a right， public 
works of any kind would be extremely difficult to under-
take. There is virtually no pri vate landowner defense to such 
a governmental exercise of compulsory purchase or recla-
mation， absent some clear evidence of bad faith. The only 
remedy， asappears below， is compensation， and even this is 
not necessarily guaranteed. What follows are some general 
themes that emerged from the study. 
Source of Authority 
While generally held to be a natural attribute of sovereignty， 
virtually every country provides some written authority for 
exercising its compulsory purchase powers， generally 
phrased as some sort oflimitation on that power. The major-
ityofcoun岡田providesuch articulationllimitation in a con-
副知tion，出 inJapan， Malaysia， Taiwan， Thailand， and the 
United States. Aus回 lia'sConstitution (制eral)provides 
limitations only for federal exercises ofthe power， and state 
constitutions are by and large silent. NeitherChina's Consti-
tution nor Singapore's Constitution contain compensation 
provisions， but both countries allow for compensation 
through individual legislative acts. This makes protection 
tenuous， however， because those laws could be changed or 
eliminated at any time， leaving land occupiers no protection 
from the governments' landholding policies because no 
clear constitutional protection exists. The process for exer-
cising compulsory purchase powers， however， isalmost 
universally a matter of national or， where relevant， state stat-
utory law. 
Public P町 poseand the Extent of Power 
One would expect the extent of the power of compulsory 
purchase to depend upon the particular country's view of 
private rights in land: the more private rights are recognized， 
the weaker the power of compulsory purchase. Our study 
does not necessarily validate this presumption. Either by 
common law (United States) or by statute and practice (A凶ー
回 lia，China， Korea， Malaysia， and Singapore) most of the 
countries make broad statements of public purpose as justi-
fications for the exercise of compulsory purchase powers. 
China and especially Hong Kong， however， where there is 
virtually no fee simple private ownership of land， contain 
limitations on the power of eminent domain. China limits 
the taking ofinterests in land from collectives. Hong Kong 
sets out specific purposes for which leaseholds may be ap-
propriated， although these釘 esufficiently broad and numer-
ous that they probably provide very litle protection against 
such compulsory acquisition by government. Both view 
such compulsory purch鎚 eas“reacquisition." Australia， on 
the other hand， finds a need to force citizens to be socially 
and environmentally responsible， without an even balance 
being struck with a constitutional protection ofprivate prop-
erty. The Australian High Court has now decided what is re-
quired ofthe citizen who is sacrificing property forthe bene-
fit of the wider community via a particular government pro-
gram， and what compensation that citizen is entitled. 
Compensation 
Virtually every coun住yprovides some measure of compen-
sation to出eprivate owner of rights in prope目yfor the inter-
ests taken by compulsory purchase. Many-as in Australia， 
the United States (limited to federal acquisitions)， Korea， 
and Malaysia-require such compensation in血eirrespec-
tive constitutions. Others， such as Singapore， provide for it 
by statute. However， the level and circurnstances of com-
pensation vary widely. Aus佐aliaand China provide com-
pensation largely for raw land value only. Moreover， China 
provides for compensation on a legislative， c部 e-by-c槌 eba-
sis. Thus， for example， one province provided compensa-
tion offive or six times the value ofthe average output for 
伽 eeyears for compulsorily taken agriculturalland. Many 
of the countries studied provide for resettlement costs 
(China， New Zealand， Singapore， and the United States)， 
though the method varies widely. Some of China's prov・
inces， for example， provide for the cost of relocation plus up 
to one month 's lost wages for displaced workers. 0血ers
provide litle or no compensation in partic叫arcircum-
stances(A凶 tralia，China， and Singapore)， though Aus回 lia
provides increased compensation up to an additionall 0% of 
market value for“solatium":“intangible and n~m-pecuniary 
disadvantage resulting from the acquisition.削 Avery few 
provide for compensation for a so-called regulatory taking 
出， for example， when a governmental regulation prevents 
virtually al economically beneficial use of a parcel ofland. 
(See previous discussion under “Regulatory" Taking.) 
Japan is also one of the few coun佐iesto use the idea of 
“land readjustment，" whereby the state returns to出eland・
owner a stake in the“combined project" for which the land-
owner's land was compulsorily taken. Malaysia and Thai-
land are considering the concept of exchanging govem-
ment land for newly appropriated land. Thailand's prob-
lems with its back10g of appropriated land and its ineffi-
cient methods of appropriating that land may be answered 
by Japan's system or by that ofTaiwan， which appropriates 
extra land for a project to give to the original homeowners 
in an “offset" manner. 
Due Process 
Most countries articulate a need for some minimum process 
白atguarantees certain procedural rights to the landowner. 
Several of the countries set out a broad right of due pro∞s 
in their respective constitutions (Korea， Malaysia， Singa-
pore， Taiwan， and the United States) although in at least one 
coun町-Singapore-thecourts問 nderedsuch process un-
necessary. Some coun住iesrequire negotiation between 
landowner and government to precede some or al exercises 
of eminent domain (Sing却 ore，Thai1and， and the Unit怠d
S匂tes)，and most coun出esprovide for negotiation at some 
1. See Australia Land Acquisition and Compensation Act， 1986 (Vict.) 
~44. 
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stage of the process. Virtually every country requires no-
tice to the occupier/owner of the land (or interests therein) 
to be acquired. 
Most countries also provide a process for appealing， ifnot 
the declaration of public pu中ose，then at least the process or 
白ecompensation award. Most also require at least one pub-
lic hearing. Some coun出esprovide a specific住ibunalfor 
appeals purposes (Hong Kong， New Zealand， and Singa-
pore). Others grant extensive compulsory powers to a 
“super agency" that does the bulk of the government “con-




Aus住aliabegan planning municipalities in the late 1800s to 
provide its citizens with residentia! areas una古田tedby in・
dustrial smoke or other nuisances.2 Since the 1920s， many 
planning schemes began to focus more on environmental 
conservation and historic preservation. These planning 
schemes map what is permitted， what requires permission， 
and what is prohibited in al sections of cities， states， and ter-
ritories. Once a state creates its general planning sch~me， 
that scheme is separated into state and local sections.' If a 
municipality wants to vary the scheme based on its unique 
environmental， cultural heritage， or natural disaster con-
cerns， it must create iいownoverlays to白eplan orcondition 
its planning permitsプRezoningand permission for certain 
projecωin discretionary land use zones require public no-
tice in al cases and ep.vironmental impact assessments for 
major developments.' Major planning concerns taken into 
account at this point ip.clude such things as public am~nity， 
pollution protection，: environmental conservation，' and 
heritage preservation. d An appeals process exists for parties 
dissatisfied with initial decisions，' be they developers or 
members ofthe public impacted by proposed development. 
2. See ROBERT FREESTONE， MOOEL COMMUNITIESーTHEGAROEN 
CITY MOVEMENT刑 AUSTRALlA(1989). Parliamentary debates at 
this time refered t'O ihe t'Own-planning m'Ovement as a justificati'On 
f'Or land use 問 f'Orms.F'Or a detailed history of planning law in the 
Australian teritory of Victoria， se Murray Raf， A History 01 Land 
Use Planning Legislation and Rights olObjection in Victoria， 22 
MONASH U. L. REV. 90 (192). 
3. See DEES ECCLES & TANNETJE BRYANT， STATUTORY PLANNING IN 
VICTORIA (1999)， f'Or a m'Ore detailed explanati'On 'OfVict'Oria' s plan-
ning system. See also TANNETJE BRYANT ET AL.， PLANNING ANO 
ENVIRONMENT SERVICE (VICTORIA) (1995) (1∞se-leaf service). 
4. See Planning and Environment Act， 1987 (Victふ
5. Seeid.~12. SeeMurrayRa任 TheRenewed Prominence 01 Environ-
mental Impact Assessment， 12ENVTし&PLANNING L.J. (AUSTRA-
LIA) 241， 251 (195). 
6. See Planning and Environment Act， 1987 (Vict.) ~84B， which問・
quires that the Vict'Orian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) 
“take account of and give e釘ectto any relevant State environment 
protection policy declared in any Order made by the Govemor in 
Council under ~ 16 of the Environment Protection Act 1970." 
7. See Department ofConservation & Natural Resources v. R'Obson， 15
AOMIN. ApP. TRIB. REP. 35 (195). 
8. Town and Country Planning Act， 1961 (Vict.). 
9. In Victoria， the apeals body is the VCAT; in New South Wales， it is 
the Land and Environment Court; in Queensland， the Planning and 
Environment C'Ourt; in S'Outh Australia， the Environment Res'Ources 
and Devel'Opment Court; in Tasmania，出eResource Management 
and Planning Appeal Tribunal; and in the Aus佐官lianCapital Teri・
ωry， the Planning Appeals Tribunal. 
The appeals process for compulsory land acquisition is 
less regimented. Australia's C~!lStitution (federal) requires 
compensation for land takings， JU but who gets that compen-
sation and why remains debatable. A rece~t.High Court de-
cision (J胎wcrestMining Ltd.以 Australia)"found that， for 
example， a mining company can be compensated for the 
loss ofincome for being unable to use cyanide leaching in a 
fragile environment， but Aborigines cannot obtain com-
pensation from the government for taking that same land 
for preservation. 
While the Australian Constitution limits federalland ac-
quisition and rl叫 uiressome compensation， the state consti-
tutions do not. J~ In Australia， state governments view com-
pulsory acquisition as taking back land previously held pri-
vately_ before the grant of a freehold tenure to private citi-
zens. U Compensation is therefo~c:: generally limited to t~~ 
owner's market value ofthe land14 and loss ofits then use/5 
with damages from nearby public projects or changes in the 
planning scheme .smly obtainable through nuisance litiga-
tion or other torts. J 0 Compensation for regulatory“expropn・
ation" is generally unavailable， although the High Court 
seerns to be leanin.g toward such compensation for totalloss 
of economic use. 11 The government can use private land for 
“public good" with litle difficulty. Public good can include 
m企astructuressuch as roads， elec仕icalsupply， sewage， and 
telecommunications， as well as public health， safety， and en-
vironmental protection. Takings for these goals can include 
physical use and loss oftitle as well as changes in the plan-
ning scheme that alter the凶 esavailable to a landowner. The 
public responsibility ofthe landowner means expropriation 
may not have occurred.印
10. See AUSTL. CONST. ~51(xxxi): The Australian Parliament may 
make laws for the peace， order and good govemment of the 
Commonwealth with respect to: 
Id. 
(xxi) The acquisi tion of property on just terms合'Omany
State or person for any puゅ'Osein respect ofwhich the Par-
liament has power t'O make laws. . 
11. (1997) 147 A.L.R. 42. 
12. See New S'Outh Wales v. C'Omm'Onwealth (Wheat Case) (1915) 20 
C.L.R.54. 
13. Land Acquisition and Compensati'On Act， 1986 (Vict.); Lands Ac-
quisiti'On Act， 1989 (Austl. Cap. Ter.); Lands Acquisition Act， 1994 
(Austl. Cap. Ter.); Lands Acquisition Act， 1996 (N. Teπ~);LandAc­
quisition (Just Terms Compensati'On) Act， 191 (N.S.W.); Acquisi・
ti'On 'OfLand Act， 1967 (Queensl.); Land Acquisiti'On Act， 1969 (S. 
Austl.); Land Acquisiti'On Act， 1993 (Tas.); and Land Adminis回・
tion Act， 1997 (W. Austl.). 
14. See Land Acquisiti'On and C'Ompensati'On Act， 1986 (Vict.) ~40 
(“Market value [is].. in問 lati'Ont'O any interest in land 'On a particu-
lar date， • • • the am'OUnt 'Ofm'Oney that W'Ould have been paid f'Or出at
in健restif it had been S'Old 'On that date by a wil[ing] but n'Ot anxi'O凶
sellerωa wiling but n'Ot anxi'Ous purchaser."). 
15. See Past'Oral Fin. Ass'n Ltd. v. Minister [(1914)] A.C. 1083. 
16. See， foranoverview， GERARO M. BATES， ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN 
AUSTRALlA 50・57(4th ed. 195). More detail can be found in HAR-
OLO LUNTZ & DAVID HAMBLY， TORTSーCASESANO MATERIALS 
(4出 ed.195) and FRANCIS A. TRINOAOE & PETER CANE，τHE 
LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALlA (199). 
17. SeeNewcrest Mining(WA) Ltd. v. A凶岡lia(1997)147 A.L.R. 42. 
18. Australian Tape Mfrs. Ass'n Ltd. v. Australia(1993) 176 C.L.R. 
480，510 (“In a case wher官anobligati'On tomake a pa戸nentis im・
伊 sed.. . asa genuine adjustrnent ofthe comp~~ng rights， ~Iai~~ or 
obligations ofi>ersons in-a particular relationship or a.r官a'Ofacti羽町y，
it is unlikely that ther官wilbe any question of an a叫uisitionofprop-
erty within s. 5 1 (xxi) 'Of the Constitution. . . .")
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China 
The Chinese Constitution has no system for compensation 
for compulsory land acquisition. Because the state officially 
owns allland， and ~~ly allows collectives， businesses， and 
individuals to凶 eit，19白egovernment can reclaim its land at 
any time. China uses specific legislative acts， not the Consti・
tution， tocalculate damages paid to land users for resettle-
ment and for such individual national projects asJmilding 
hydroelectric dams or maintaining f100d control."'υ 
There are nevertheless some limits to what land govem-
ment can seize. For example， land taken合omfarming col-
lectives， or state-owned land that is having its use changed， 
must be used for national economic， infrastructure， de-
fense， orsocial service p!.ojects， alofwhich are defined by 
the federal government-il Also，state land bureaus mustap-
prove any government use of， and construction on， the 
land. The failure of either condition results in the failure of 
land appropriation.22 
The government grants pa戸nentfor resettlement costs 
and for probable or real loss of凶 e，not for how the land 
might have been used or for emotionalloss. The organiza-
tion白atwill use the expropriated land actually pays the 
compensation. If the present land users must be moved J?e-
fore expropriation， the new users must relocate the old.μIf 
the oril!inalland users move thernselves. the new users must 
compensate them戸Compensationtakes the form of cash， 
bank deposits， or direct replacement of buildings and/or 
crops. That compensation must be凶 edaccording to a plan 
prepared by the original !~nd user and approved by the ex-
propriating organizatiQp.，25 with strict disciplinary measures 
for failure to comply戸
19. P.R.c.CoNsT.(l98)art.1O(“Land in the urban areas of cities shal 
be owned by the state. Land in rura1 and suburban areas shal be 
owned by colectives except for the portions designated as owned by 
state according to 1aw. Residentia1 dis凶ct，間serveddistrict and問-
served mountain shal be owned by the colectives."). 
20. See， e.g.， Rights ωthe Use of Land Ordinance in Shanxi Gansu 
Ningxia Remote Area (194); Compensation Act for F100d Contro1 
Construction in Henan Province (1952); Expropriation Act for the 
Cons加 ctionofthe Nationa1 Project (1953); Amendment for Coun-
try Cooper百tivesP吋ectsOrdinance (1962); Expropriation Ordi-
nance for Nationa1 Projects (1982); Fie1d Law of the P.R.C. (1985); 
Fishery Law of the P.R.C. (1986); Land Administration Law of the 
P.R.C. (1986); Law on Reins匂館mentofLand(198); Lawon C冶m・
pensation， Resett1ement Subsidies in Compu1sory Land Acquisition 
for Big or Medium Wa町 Supp1yand Hydroe1ectric Power P1an岱
(191). 
21. Land Administration Law of the P.R.C.， arts. 21 and 2: 
Artic1e 21 
When the state need to requisition 1and owned by colec-
tives or to use state-owned 1and for economic， cu1tural or 
nationa1 defense construction projects and for initiating 
public works. . . . 
Artic1e 22 
U凹napprova1， cons回 ctionunits rnay app1y for use of1and 
needed for those sta旬 cons回 ctionprojects which are listed 
in the state fixed asets investment p1an orwhich may be bui1t 
in accordance with state provisions. 
22. See id. art. 25. 
23. Id. art. 34. 
24. Id. art. 28， cl.1. 
25. See id. art. 30 ("[a]lI kinds of compensation and reset1ement subsi-
dies . .  shal not be used for other purposes and shal not be apropri-
ated by any unit or individua1"). 
26. Id. art. 49. Artic1e 15 ofCrimina1 Law (embezz1ement) ap1iesω 
cases with no extenuating circumstances， with sentences' ianging 
合'omfewer than five year百ofincarceration to death. 
Each region sets its rules for compensation use and its 
standards of compensation for resettlement. Calculation of 
compensation for land is very speci白c，and is determined by 
the use ofthe land before its expropriation， and by a multiple 
ofthe av~!age amount earned by that land over a set number 
ofyears."" Ifthe land had been凶 edby the state for offices， 
armed forces， or nonprofit organizations， the state would 
pay for the material costs of the demolished buildings on the 
land. If the land is to be used for“special" circurnstances， 
such as for water supply on hydroelectric power plants， dif-
ferent calculations would岡山ed，based on the specific leg-
islation for those land uses. 28 Calculations for the'loss of re~­
idences are based on the material costs ofthe buildings， and 
compensation includes residences in the new location， ei-
ther via rent money or providing the residence itself. 
If land compensation and resettlement payments ac-
cording to the government 何回tionsstil fail to P.!lt people 
back at their originallevel， restitution follows.""ヲ Thena-
tional government decides al of the values， and national 
policy dictates what use ofthe land is most appropriate and 
by whom. 
China's land use planning appears to revolve around 
whether land is designated urban， suburban， rural， ormoun-
匂in.All cities are owned by the state， while collectives (10・
cal forrns of administrative rule) own the suburban and rural 
areas unless designated as state-owned areas. Collectives 
also own residential dis出ctsand mountain reserves. Be-
cause the government owns al ofChina's land， and dictates 
how that land will be used， the government resolves any 
land disputes， not the co町 ts.Thus， the government decides 
白eland use and allows citizens the right to fulfil that use. 
HongKong 
Hong Kong is the ultimate landlord戸HongKong's federal 
government， asthe landlord and planner for the island， con-
trols every element of land use through planning ordi-
nances， lease conditions， and building ordinances. While 
the People's Republic ofChina officially owns al the land， 
Hong Kong manages the property according to its long-term 
plans for density， location， and manner of development. The 
island has three population density z~nes 血at are main-
tained through the bUilding ordinanees31 and leasing condi-
tions， which are created when leases are renewed， modified， 
or newly gTanted. These leases， however， are site-specific. 
Therefo民 zoningchanges can only be implemented piece-
meal and sometimes slowly， because most leases are for 
75 years. 
The building ordinances also follow the zoning plans and 
are site-specific. These ordilll!nCeS are for safety and to 
maintain continuity in an area戸TheBuilding Authority en-
sures a building rnaintains出eappear加lceof a neighbor-
27. See id. art. 30. 
28. See， e.g.， Law on Compensation， Resett1ement Subsidies in Com-
pu1sory Land Acquisition for Big or Medium Water Supp1y and Hy-
droe1ectric Power P1ants. 
29. See Land Adminis甘'ationLaw of the P.R.C. a氏 29.
30. See Shun Shing Hing Inv. Co. L凶.v. Attomey Genera1， [(1983)] 
H.K.L.R. 433，434 (describing the Hong Kong govemment as the 
sole 1and10rd). 
31. See Hong Kong Bui1ding (P1aning) Regu1ations. 
32. See Kerna1 Bokhary， Section 16(1)(g) 01 the Building Ordinance 
(Cap 123夫-AShooter's Guide， (1989) 19 H.K.L.J. 314 (1989). 
10-2001 NEWS & ANALYSIS 31 ELR 11189 
hood， and implements the density controls of the . site's 
zone， as set out in the Town Planning Ordinance. jj  The 
Building Authority has no control over the permitted 
change of a building's u~~ ， but only over changes or devel-
opment of its structure.34 
Two typ.~s ofnonstatuωry plans" and two types of statu-
tory plansA6set the stage fbr development in Hong Kong. 
The nonStaωtory plans set out standards and guidelines on 
such topics as the environrnent and residential densities， and 
create medium and long-term planning strategies for Hong 
Kong's five sub-regions. These broad plans provide the plat-
form for the more local statutory development plans. The 
Town Planning Ordinance allows the planning board to per-
mit certain uses within the development J?lan， which in-
cludes descriptive notes to its zone mapsプ
The board問 viewscontested decisions made by one of 
the board's two planning committees. Any further review 
goes to the Town Planning Appeal Board， 'Ytose decision is 
final， unless a judicial review is approved戸Likethe origi-
nal plans， these decisions do not include public input or 
hearings; they are ma悦 rsonly for the developer and出eap-
propriate committee. Permission comes after consideration 
of a detai1ed master layout plan and with conditions， such as 
that permission wi11apse unless the project begins within 
three years. For violations of a development plan， !te Direc-
tor ofPlanning has three methods of enfoぉemene~: issuing 
a notice 児 quiringthe development to be m~de conform-
mgア回quiIingthe development be stopp'cd，41 or requiring 
由。landto be reinstated to Us original USe:42 Not al de~elop: 
ment goes before the planning committees， however. If the 
land is not paロofa statutory development plan， the devel-
oper must only meet the requirements of the applicable 
bui1ding ordinances and lease conditions. 
Because the governrnent owns al the land， and can regain 
comple旬∞ntrolupon the expiration of1eases， it rarely ex-
ercises compulsory acquisition. It does， however， occasion-
ally 陀 claimleased land befo回 thelease expires， often in-
cluding that option in the lease. The Lands Resumption Or-
dinance also allows takings if the property has become a 
health hazard. is needed for national defense. or is needed 
fora“public pu中ωe叩 Atlea山田month's public notice 
is required， and during that time either the land's owner or an 
interest holder may agree to a voluntary sale. With such an 
agreement， the resum 
tion becomes a sale.44 Otherwise， the land stil reverts to the 
governrnent at the end of the notice period， but within 28 
days，.!he governrnent must begin the compensation proce-
dureヤCompensationis paid on the value ofthe land (deter-
rnined by the amount oftime left on the lease)， ih:tvalue of 
any legally built construction._on the property，咽 and出e
costs of disrupting the owners ，47 and the-neighbOrs ，4H liveli-
hoods. These amounts， which山田lyrelate to the amount 
expected if the property were offered o!} the open market， 
can be appealed to &the "Lands Tribunal，49 but tlIe “resump-
tion" itself cannot. The land user can also appeal compensa・
tion amounts for takings of easements or parts ofhis land for 
roads， railways， and airport height restrictions，部 well凶
pa凶altakings through changed ordinances. Compensation 
for property affected by conservation areas or by changes in 
land value because of new zoning is rare， however. Thus， al-
though the Basic Law QfHong Kong requi問 scompensation 
only -at market value，50 the govenun.ent has leamed that to 
speed the acquisition of land， it should pay higher compen-
sation than legally required. 
Japan 
Japan has a multitiered system of land planning， from the 
national旬白emunicipa1. All are based on public safety and 
even distribution of indus仕yand問 sidentialzones， while 
preserving set percentages ofhistoric and natural areas. The 
national plan includes such considerations 郡山eofnatural 
問 sources，pro旬ctionfrom natural disasters， locations and 
sizes ofurban and suburban areas， industry locales， an.4 pro-
jections of elec住icalneeds for metropolitan areas.~l Be-
ca凶 eofthe rise of1and values in Japan， the coun仕yenacted
the Land Fundamental Law in 1989， declaring， through pol・
icy objectives， the country's vision of organized develop-
ment while preserving public welfare on multiple levels. 
Public welfare also controls the expropriatiq~ of private 
land， which isJimited by Japan's Constitution.~~ Most land 
expropriationJj includes a negotiation among the project 
initiator， the landowner， and any other concemed parties， 
even when it is ぬ.~type ofproject listed under the Land Ex-
propriation Law.~'1 Ifthe project planner thinks negotiation 
wi1 be difficult， he can ask for“recog凶tion"of the project 
44. See id. ~4A. 
45. Id. ~6(1). 
46. Id. ~1O(1). 
47. Id. ~1O(2)(c). 
48. Id. ~ 1O(2)(b). 
49. Id. ~6(3). 
50. See Basic Law art. 105: 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shal， in ac-
cordance with law， protect the right of individuals and legal 
persons to the acquisition， use disposal and inheritance of 
property and their right to compensation for lawful depriva-
tion oftheir propeロy.Such compensation shal coπ'espond to 
the real value ofthe propeロyconcemed at the time and shal 
be合elyconvertible and paid without delay. 
51. See TSUYOSHI KOTAKA， LAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTNITIES 79 
(1984); YORIAKI NARITA， LAND POLlCY AND LAW 46 (1989). 
52. See JAPAN CONST. art. 29，官3.
53. See TSUYOSHI KOTAKA， RESEARCH ON JUST COMPENSATION 28 
(Mi司oLaw Series No. 4， 2∞0); TSUOSHI K()TAKA， COMM_ENTARY 
TO rnE LAND EXPROPRIATION LAW (1980); MICHIKAZU OZAWA， 
INTERPRETA TION OF THE LAND EXPROPRIA TION LAW (rev. 1995). 
54. Enacted in 1951 under JAPAN CONST. art. 29，官 3.
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by the Minister of Land In企astructureand Transport， who 
then sets the extent of land }}eeded， how it will impact the 
publj~ and the environment，5 the exact list of interested par~ 
Iies，56 and how much compensation the owner deserves.引
The recognition process may require less diplomacy， but it is 
time-consurning and “bureaucratic." The project initiator， 
the landowner and any intet:.~sted parties also must sign the 
record of land and articles.58 
National guidelines decide the compensation required 
by Japan's Constitution (gr the public taking of both pri-
vate and public property.59 Complete physicalloss ofpri-
vate propedy receives ful economic compensation，60via 
market value， but nothing for potential econ9mic， subjec-
tive， emotional， historical， or eultural value.61 If any party 
is dissatisfied with the appropriation of the land or the 
amount offered in compensation， that person may request 
an investigation by the Minister of construction or file a 
lawsuit. If a public facility is appropriated， the project initi-
ator must replace it elsewhere， not just pay replacement 
value. A recent decision by the Sapporo District Court that 
held illegal the government's taking process relating to the 
construction of a dam owing to the failure to adequately 
consider the cultural in!erests of indigenous Ainu property 
62 owners is instructive. 
Some regulations also lower the value ofproperty by lim-
iting its凶 es.For example， a regulation出atlirnits出euseof
or lowers the value of a property to prevent disasters will not 
be compensated because s~ch a regulation has more value in 
public ~l.lfety and welfare.63 Seen as forms 9f public welfart:， 
~oning64 and regulations for public works，65 Inaintenance，6 
and safety also do not require just compensation. Ifthe regu・
lation is to protect historical， natural， or cultural sites， how-
ever， that kind of regulatory taking requires compensation. 
55. See Land Expropriation Law art. 20. 
56. See id. art. 8，市3proviso. 
57. Id. art. 71. 
58. See id. arts. 36， 38. 
59. See Guideline ofS tandard for Compensation for Los Caused by Ac-
quisition of Land for Public Use (1967). 
60.“Ful compensation" has been determinedωmean "just compensa・
tion，" as found through the Land Expropriation Law's“adversary 
dωtrine" (a口.48，13;art. 49，市2)，which is a manner of compromise 
created among the project initiator， the landowner， and other inter-
ested pa凶es.
61. See Guideline ofStandard for Compensation for Loss Caused by Ac-
quisition of Land for Public Use art. 7; id. art. 8，唱 4.
62. See Kayano v. Hokkaido Expropriation Comm. [Nibutani Dam deci-
sion]， 1598 HANREI JIHO 3， 938 HANREI TIMES 75 (1997)， 38 
I.L.M. 394 (Mark A. Levin trans.， 199) (Sapporo Dist. Ct. Mar. 27， 
197). The annotated translation of this decision (available at 
http://www.hawaii.edu/law/facpubs/nibutani.htmland at 
h叩://www.hawaii.ed山 w/facpubs/nub幽 ni.pdη(Iastvisi ted July 
20，2001) ofers a concise， real-Iife example of Japan's expropriation 
proces. See also Mark A. Levin， Essential Commodities and Racial 
Justice， Using Constitutional Protection of Japan S Indigenous Ainu 
People to Inform Understandings ofthe United States and Japan， 3
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 419，445・5(2∞1) (seting out the ad-
ministrative proces in the Nibutani case in fine detail). 
63. See Masami Takatsuzi， Study on Property Right， 38JICHI-KENKYU 
4，3(1962). 
64. For an example， se City Planning Law art. 7. 
65. See， e.g.， id.arts. 53， 54;ReadjustmentofTown Lots Law art. 76. 
66. See， e.g.， Road Law ar包.4，4;River Law art. 54; Coast Law art. 7; 
Port Law art. 37; and Mining Lawart. 64. 
Compensation is paid for the value ofthe lostl，se ofthe land 
if an actual loss in property can be proved.ol 
South Korea 
The South Korean Constitution guarantees the property 
rights of al citizens，)ncluding just compensation for com-
pulsory acquisition.Od Strict land use planning acts， such 
as the Urban Planning Act (UPA) and the Building 
Act， limit constitutional rights ofproperty ownership， 
particularly concerning construction. If these restric-
tions require specific sacrifices of owners， beyond ac-
cepted zoning prohibitions， the government may owe 
compensation， but that is rare. With South Korea 's small 
landmass， general limitations on construction are 
widely accepted. 
Orderly urban growth controls most South Korean plan-
ning decisions， with both safety and aesthetics playing a 
role. For South Korea's system ofSpecific Use Areas， plan-
ners consider the shape and q田 lityofthe land to find its best 
pu中ose，and then prevent any contradictory uses. After di-
viding the land into urban and nonurban areas， the govern-
ment further divides the land into fournonintegrated ç~tego・
ries: residential， commercial， industrial， and green.oッ Each
urban area has zoning res甘ictionson the types， sizes， and 10-
cations of buildings and their functions. The regulations 
governing land use in each area deterrnine the respective 
landowner百， rights. A landowner will not be compensated 
for lack of ability to use his land in a manner that the regula-
tions prohibit. 
The “zone system" deterrnines those development regu-
lations. Zoning a肘 mptsto evenly spread population， ser-
vices， and facilities， including agriculture， parks， and green 
belts， through four zones: Urbanization Control， Detailed 
Planning， Metropolitan Planning， and Development Re-
striction (green belt). Once deterrnined， the UPA provides 
the specific regulations for the zones. Adrninis住ativeac-
tions白atchange one's land designation may be considered 
a taking that requires compensation. 
Whether such restrictions should be compensated is be・
ing debated now， because only a“restriction of private prop-
erty for public necessity" w~rrants compensation under白e
So~th Korean ConstitUtion.70 Interpretations of出atphr加 e
vary. If， for example， one owns property that later rezoned， 
scholars believe that the 9.wner makes a special sacrifice and 
is owed compensation/1 while the governrnent views a 
rezoning as the constant creation of the expected social 
boundaries and limitations ofland ownership， which do not 
67. See Sup. Ct. Nov. 27， 1968，22 Keishu 12， 1402. The Land Expropri-
ation Law was made a partial amendment in July 2001. 
68. See S. KOREA CONST. art. 23， which guarantees citizens' right to 
property， that property rights must conform to public welfare， 
and that expropriation and just compensation wil be governed 
by law. 
69. Seeid.a目.120(2)(“Theland and natural resources shal be protected 
by the State， and the State shal establish a plan necessary for their 
balanced development and utilization."). 
70. Id. art. 23(3). 
71. YUNHEMPARK，ANEWLECTUREON AOMINISTRATIVELAW717 
(197); DONG HEE KIM， THE AOMINISTRATIVE LAW 315 (197); 
NAM JIN KIM， THE AOMINISTRATIVE LAW 526 (195). On the side 
that it does not require compensation， se WON Woo SUH， Ao-
MINISTRATIVE LAW THEORY IN AN AGE OF TRANSITION 863-76 
(197). 
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require compensation.72 Under considerョtionnow is the re-
quest ofpeople living in the Development Res仕ictedZone 
(DRZ) (2.2% of the national population) for compensation 
through elimination of the zone because of the low eco-
nomic value of their property andJm arguable lack of“pub・
lic necessity" ofthat type ofzone.73 Anotherdebate revolves 
around how much compensation forrezoning is needed. Ac-
cording to the Constitutional Court， compensation for 
rezoning by designation of a DRZ is based on the immediate 
change ofvalue， n_~t on projected earnings on the land as it 
was zoned before.川 Thevalue differential is substantial， es-
pecially because the coyyt found compensation necessary 
only for a building site.75 
Another difference is that between the compensation 
given to tho~ç who accept the governme!.1fs offer through 
consultation76 and those 'who adjudicate.77 When the go;'-
ernment wants to physically appropriate private land， the 
agency involved must both publicly and directly noti命local
authorities， the landowner， the project con甘actor，and other 
concerned pa出es.Upon surveying the land and structures， 
an offer is made to the owner. Usually the offer is much 
lower than that which could be obtained through adjudica-
tion by a land commission. This is an added concern because 
the number of acquisitions rose from 96 in 1980 to 2，010 in 
1991， due in part to s仕ongeconomic development and a re-
sultant increased number of public projects. The landown-
ers can agree through consultation with the government or 
appeal the land's appropriation， itsproposed use， the length 
of that山 e，and the amount of compensation， unless the 
property is needed for temporary emergency public safety 
requirements after natural disasters or other m勾oraCCl-
dents. The later type of land appropriation cannot exceed 
six months. 
Malaysia 
While the Malay!?tan Constitution protects a person's right 
to own property，78 that right is not absolute. All land-is 
vested in the state， and the state allows citizens to own the 
land subject to the state 's needs. In this regard， only the state 
is empowered to dispose of state land. The government can 
impose categories of land use on land's titl~， make condi-
tions and restrictions on interest in the land，79 and reacquire 
72. See Constitutional Court Decision ofJune 3，191 (89 Heon ma 46); 
Constitutiona1 Decision of Sept. 16， 191 (89 Heon ma 152); Su-
preme Court Decision of Aug. 8， 1990 (89 bu 2); Ministry of Con-
struction and Transportation， An Opinion to the Constitutional Court 
Decision ofNov. 3， 191 (89 Heon rna 213); and An Opinion to the 
Constitutiona1 Petition Regarding Artic1e 21 of the UPA (Nov. 1， 
193). 
73. For more discusion about this debate， se 1 Do CHANG KIM， THE 
GENERAL THEORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 588 (190); 1 YUN 
HEUM PARK， A NEW LECTURE ON ADMINISTRATNE LAW 690 
(197). 
74. See Constitutional Court Decision ofDec. 24， 198 (97 Heon ba 78). 
75. See id. 
76. See Act on Special Cases Conceming the Acquisition of Land for 
Public Use and the Compensation for Their Los. 
77. See Land Expropriation Act. 
78. See MALAY. CONST. art. 13: 
(1) No person shal be deprived ofproperty save in acor-
dance with law. 
(2) No law shal provide for the compu1sory acquisition or 
use ofprope口ywithout adequate compensation. 
79. See National Land Code 1965 ~105 
any land ostensibly needed for the coun町'seconomic de-
velopment， public need， or recreational purposes. The gov-
ernment detern討nesthe land use (agricultural， building， or 
industrial)"V when someone buys or leases the land， assuring 
that the use conforms to long-term development pll!~s. The 
use is documented on the registerdocument oftitle.引Aside
from allowing the owner to make a living企omand enjoy his 
land， use and enjoyment ofland i~ res出ctedto that oflawful 
use and reasonabIe enjoyment.82 
For the taking ofprivate land， the Land Acquisition Act 
1960 (the Act) requires due process for government appro-
priation. Government appropriatioQ. is considered valid for 
any public or recreational p山pose，. or to improve the eco-
nomic n~tatus of Malaysia~84 al of which are hard to dis-
prove.85 However， the landowner is entitled to a hearing 
during which the owner may object to the amount of the 
award or attempt to show malafides on the part ofthe state. 
The government rarely loses such cases， but occasionally 
the government has faced difficulties with the initial appli-
cation process to acquire the land. The specific govern-
ment agency must prove that the p町 poseof the compul-
sory land taking is in the public interest or for the economic 
development of the nation， and that the taking is feasi・
ble. A new amendrnent to the Land Acquisition Act of 
1991， however， implies that whether or not the govern-
ment uses the appropriate<!Jand as proposed， the appro-
priation will remain'valid.86 Only ifthe appropriation is 
not completed within two years ofbeing“gazetted" (0ι 
ficially advertised) will a legal technicality nullify the 
acquisition proceedings and return ownership ofthe par-
cel to the private landowner. 
Compensation for government appropriations is based on 
the owner's present and future possible uses (ifthey are nc! 
too remote) for the land under existing planning zonesピ.プ。
Prices on similar t仕ra卸ctωsof lal!g inthe area help determine 
the amount of c∞omp伊ensa剖tiぬo∞n民1L，8総8and compensaIion is avail-
able 0!1y for buildings on the land that meet regulation 
c∞od白es.89"Nolaw reguIates the specifics of compensation 
amounts， but the guiding principle is to put the claimant 
back into an econoI!~c position equivalent to that before 
the land was taken.90 fhe First Sehedule of the Act ex-
plains compensation computation by finding the market 
80. Id. ~52( 1). 
81. Id. ~78(3). 
82. Id. ~ 103. 
83. Id. ~3(1 )(c) (197). 
84. See id. ~3(b) (1991) (land may be acquired by a state agency “by 
any person or coゅorationfor any puゅosewhich in the opinion of 
the State Authority is beneficia1 to the economic deve10pment of 
Malaysia or any part thereof or to the pub¥ic generaly or any c1as 
of the pub¥ic . . .").
85. See id. ~8(3). 
86. Id. ~68A (1 991)(“Whe問 anyland has been acquired under this Act， 
whether before or after the commencement of this section， nosubse-
quent disposal or use 0仁ordea¥ing with， the land， whether by the 
State Authority or by the Govemment， person or coゅorationon 
whose behalfthe land was acquired， shal1 inva¥idate血eacquisition 
of the land."). 
87. See id. ~~3(2)， 3A (197). 
8. See id.可1A of the First Schedule (197). 
89. See id.唱3A(197). 
90. See Pentabir Tanah Daerah Gombak v. Huat Heng (Lim Low & 
Sons) Sdn.Bhd.， 3 M.L.J. 282 (190). 
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value ofthe land91; any value increase or decrease because 
ofthe anticipated， new山 e;and what elements are to be ig-
nored. The landow~~r or other interested party can contest 
the aw~!d amount，92 but only if the amount -exceeds RM 
15，00093 and only.before aceepting the money or within a 
certain time lirnit:94 The burden iS~9ñ the owner to prove that 
the amount offered is inadequate.95 A judge and tWo land as-
sessors hear the case， and their judgment is final. 
The method of compensation in Malaysia may be chang-
ing. Instead of paying the landowner for appropriated 
prope町， the govemment is con~Xdering a system of land 
exchange within the same area.96 This method may im-
prove the landowner's sense of participation， but it has yet 
to be implemented. 
NewZealand 
A requiring authorityアthroughdirect negotiations between 
the govemment and the owner， statute， compulsory requir~::: 
Ilents hr public works，or an Envimmnent Cout orderfs 
may appropriate land in New Zealand. The defining legisll!: 
tive acts follow the principles of sustainable rnanagemen~:: 
and regulate takings and eompensation for public works.IO 
If a requiring authority needs the land for a public works or 
utility， the land can be “designated." This means that once 
the requiring authority proves its need and the legality of a 
land taking， through a public notice and hearing process，出e
then-designated land can be taken despite objections， so 
long a~)ts planned use legally fits the area's development 
plans.1
山
Thedesignated land must be acquired for it~~~句ted
purpose within five years， or the designation lap叩 s.102Any
int怠restedperson can see~_l! “resource consent"合omsome-
one in cont.r~l ofthe land.103 The reso町 ceconsent lasts only 
two years. .~~ 
New Z~~Jand does not consider compulsory land 
acquisition 105 as an infringement on propeロyrights， but 
more as a need to provide adequate compensation. Compen-
sation entails econornic replacement for the land on the ba-
91. See Kho Choon Je v. Superintendent ofLands & Surveys， Third Dト
vision， 1 M.L.J. 265 (1972) (market value is“the price which an 
o~~r willin~t~ut not o~ligedωsell might reasonably expectぬob-
旬in合。ma wiling purchaser with who he was bargaining for the sale 
and purchase of the said land"). 
92. See National Land Code ~37. 
93. See Re Yeap Char Ee， S.S.L.R. 94 (1932). 
94. See Mohd Saperi Mohd Nasir Iwn P加 tadbirTanah Daerah Alor 
Gajah，5 M.しJ.800 (197). (‘'lwn"=“いin Bhasa Malaysia). 
95. See Ong Yan & Anor v. Collecωr of Land Reven川崎， Alor Gajah， 
Malacca， 1 M.L.J. 405 (1986). 
96. Malaysia is considering introducing land readjustrnent， asis done 
in Japan. 
97. A“requiring authority" is a public， civic body or a private comp唱ny
出atembarks upon public works. 
98. The Environment Court is a specialist co叫rtthat reviews takings 
claims， among other resource management， p1anning， and conserva-
tion questions. 
99. See Resource Management Act， 191 (例N臼.Z.)
l叩0ωO.See Public Works Act， 1981 (N.Zふ
101. See Resource Management Act， 1991 (N.Z.) ~166. 
102. See id. ~ 184. 
103. See id. ~88. 
104. See id. ~125. 
105. Public WorksAct， 1981 (N.Z.) ~~23・27， exp1ain直也ecomp喝Isory
acquisition of land procedures. 
sis of fair market value106 and planned use， 107出 well出 re-
settleme~!.~osts together with a small amount for loss of en-
joyment. lUO The govemment also pays compensation to af: 
fected holders of 印刷reestates， neighbors， and tenants. 1U'J 
Objections about the proposed taking go before the Envi-
ronment Cou可Îbutthe court does not decide compensa・
tion amounts.且山
If the Environrnent Court reverses compulsory acquisi-
tion， barring appeals to the High Court， the land m~t be of-
fered for resale to its original owne巳ifpracticable. 111 Other-
wise， the land may b~. C>ffered for sale to adjoining landown-
ers or to the pu~Hc. ，<. By default， it also could be labeled 
“Crown Land/，.l3 something the indigenous Maori con-
tinue to fight. 14 
Singapore 
Sing!l;哩ore'sState Lands Act regulates state land in the na-
tion， 11 0 and sets out four methods of alienating land合om出e
stateωpri~~te owners. Two of these me由o也(出ees凶 ein
perpetufty116 a~~ the le蹴)are su句ectto state conditions 
and covenants，1I7 and the leases cannot exceed 99 years.18 
The govemment can change the conditions and covenants at 
any time， and the land grantee. .Qr lessee is bound by the 
changes， with or without notice. 19 One method， the fee sim-
ple， does not include these conditions，.!~.ut it is very rare for 
Ibe'state to alienate land in fee simpleYO The other method， 
the temporary _<?ccupation license， is govemed by the State 
Lands Rules~121 
The Planning Act defines al legal rules of planning in 
Singapore. The Planning Act includes the “master plan，" 
which is reviewed every five years. It is the framework for 
zoning under which the Urban Reqc:yelopment Authority 
(URA) and private developers work. 12 Public works and ur-
ban planning authorities can subrni.1.proposals for changing 
their area's master plan at any time. 123 TIIe Planning Act also 
106. See id. ~60(l). 
107. Id. ~62(2). 
108. Id. ~~62-68 (compensation); ~~72・74 (tinancial asistance). 
109. Id. ~63. 
110. Id. ~23(3). 
11. Id. ~40. 
112. Id. ~42. 
113. Id. ~42(3). 
114. See Gisbome Ltd. v. Smiler (Court of Appeal) CA No 182/98， Apr. 
26， 199. 
115. See Cap. 314 (1985 rev. ed.). See generally 7 W.J.M. RICQUIER， 
LAND LAW (2d ed. 195). 
116. See SHERIDAN， MALAYA AND SINGAPORE， THE BORNEO TERRト
TORIES ch. 13， at14 (1961). 
17. SeeState LandsAct~~4・6;see generally RICQUIER， supra note 15， 
at 12-13. 
118. Id. rule 10 (“The削 eordinarilyωbe isued shal be a lease for a term 
not exceeding [9] years乃.
119. Seeid.目 ~8 (“An asigne of， orany person who becomes a proprietor 
of any land in Singapore， shal be bound by such exceptions， reser-
vations， orcovenants (restrictive or otherwise) contained in the 




121. See State Lands Rules 1968， rules 19-25. 
12. Planning Act， Cap. 232， pt.I， ~~6・ 1 1.
123. See id. ~7. 
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contains development 3:Q9 subdivision plans.124 A land-
owner cannot subdividew or develop his prope目yin any 
way白atchanges the outer appearance ofbuildings or land 
without getting permission from the authorities， who look 
to the master plan-126Permission for any changes also re-
quires a development charge， which is a percentage ofthe 
estimated appreciati~l).)n the land's value after the devel-
opment is êômpl~~.!!.127 Noncompliance at any level is a 
criminal ofTense-128 
One way that Singapore has been able to retain control 
over its growth is through the compulsory p町 'chaseofland. 
As of 1975， the state owned about 65% ofthe nation's land， 
compared to 49% in 1969， and the trend tq~ard increasing 
state" ownership seems to be continuing.129 Much of血e
planning worK of the past 30 years has been accomplished 
by the URA，130 which-is responsible for accumulating land， 
planning 印刷regrowth and resettlement of those whose 
land the government takes， preserving h!~~ory， and main-
taining property acquired for -future plans.131 The URA may 
also dec1are an area to be an urban development area， th凶
setting in motion thc government's acquisition of the area 
within three years. 132 Other public ageneies can also appro-
priate private land if they can prove the land is needed for 
their functions， sl!ch出 forroads and other public infrastruc-
仰向orfacilities.13 While the Land Acquisition Act requires 
the govemment to first attempt private negotiation for land， 
the courts have ruled that negotiation is too much of a b町・
den. To speed along acquisitions， the government often re-
so巾 tocompulsory purchase. 
Singapore amended its Constitution to elirninate a guar-
antee of ~çl~quate compensation for al compulsorily taken 
property.134 Now， the Land Acquisition Act governs com-
pensation. This compensation inc1udes the prope口y'spres・
ent rnarket value， darnage to land stil owned by the private 
party， resettlement expenses for home or business， and title 
fees. The Act provides that prope口Y.tpbe taken requires 
public notice and printing in a-gaZette~ 135 Such“g回 etting"is 
considered sufficient evidence that白eproperty is required 
by the government-136The pdnting in thegazette also sets 
the也teof acquisition by the government. lJ/ When the need 
for the property is particularly urgent， the govemment can 
take the land prior to public notice， ifthe notice is published 
within a week of taking possession. Only “interested par・
124. See id. pt. I， ~~12・24.
125. Id. ~12(3). 
126. Id. ~3(l). 
127. Id. ~36(l)・(6).
128. Id. ~~12(4)， 30. 
129. See PHILIP MOTHA， SINGAPORE REAL PROPERTY GUIDE 7-13 (2d 
ed. 1982). 
130. Established by the Urban Redevelopment Authority Act of 1973. 
131. See Urban Redevelopment Authority Act， Cap. 340， ~6 (1990 
rev. ed.). 
132. See id. ~8. 
133. See Str官etWorks Act， Cap. 320A. 
134. See Republic of Singapore Independence Act 1965 ~6. Also， in
1966， a recommendation to reinstate a measure of adequate compen-
sation for compulsory acquisition was rejected; see genera/ly S. 
JAYAKUMAR， CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1976). 
135. See Land Acquisition Act ~3. 
136. Id. ~5. 
137. Id. ~33(6). 
ties，138 (does not include tenants)139 can apply for compen-
sation， which has no set procedure for allocation or amount. 
If a pa町 disagreeswith the amount offered，せUltperson 
must object irnme<l;i~tely or lose the chance of an appeal. 
The Appeals Board 140 decides on the amount or existenee of 
the payment， 0巳ifthe amount is accepted， the. .collector 
141 
takes possession of the property upon payment. 
While the regularity and ease of compulsory purchase are 
beneficial， the level of compensation has been a cause of 
concem. In accordance with a formula set out in the Land 
Acquisition Act， the date upon which the property is ac-
quired <:i~.terrnines the rate at which the property will be回-
sessed: ~~L The market value is based on re住ospective
values附 andthe lowest of possible uses， either that for 
which the landowner used the land. or that for which the 
government plans to use it. 1斜 Improvementsrnade旬 the
land two years prior to government acquisition are not taken 
into account， nor， among eight other factors， are the urgency 
of its acquisition 9.r: the injury caused to the landowner by 
the land's taking.145 
Taiwan 
Taiwan's three-tiered planningl46 begins with the national， 
flows to the regional， and then to the local， with the higher 
tier guiding the lower one. The national plan sets the poli-
cies foりhecoun紅yand standardizes the ideas for regional 
plans，山 whichfocus on development and natural resour~.~ 
preseIvation. The national plan， imlike the regional plans， 148
lacks legal stature. The local plans split ~çtween regulating 
land use within the urban ancI nonurban 149 areas. T1Ie urban 
area150 is divided into several zones to which use and devel-
opment must conform， or批 landownerwillbe subject仙 o
fines and orders to remove， change， orstop using the build-
ing or land. Every five years， the governmental authority re-
views the zones:回 sidential，commercial， ind凶出.al，agri-
cultural. conservation. administration. culture and educa-
tion， scenic， and specified use zones.151 However， despite 
the enforcement mechanisms for these zoning controls， 
land use violations are evident everywhere， due apparently 
to the nonbinding status of the national plan， and the lack 
138. Id. ~2. 
139. See Cap. 58， 1985 Rev. Ed. 
140. See Lands Acquisition Act ~23. 
141. See id. ~ 16. 
142. Id. ~33(l) (195); Colector of Land Revenue v. Ang Thian Soo 
(1990)， 1 M.L.J. 327. 
143. Seethe Lands Acquisition Act ~33(1)(1995): thepropeはyωnbeas-
ses唱edat rates as old as出ωefrom January 1， 1986， toas民centas 
January 1， 195. 
144. Se官 id.
145. See id. ~34. 
146. The highest tier is“Land General Deve10pment Planning，" the mid-
dle tier is“Regional Planning，" and the lowest tier is“Urban 
Planning" and “Non-Urban Land Use Planing." 
147. Pr官sent1y，four regional plans exist: northem， cen町al，southem， and 
eastem Taiwan. 
148. The 問gionalplanning was promulgating under th崎 Regiona1
Planning Law， enacted in 1974. 
149. Nonurban zones are managed through the Regional P1anning Law 
and Rules for the Non-Urban Land Use Control， with options for 
more than 10 posible zoning categories. 
150. About 444 urban p1anning areas curent1y exist. 
151. See the Urban Planning Law art. 32. 
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of serious enforcement efforts by the responsible govem-
ment authority. 
The public has litle chance to comment on any ofthe pro-
cesses ofland use planning. Aside from a 30・daycomment
period on creating urban land use zones， landowners have 
no opportunity to present their opinions. For example， if
land is zoned nonurban， landowners can neither complain， 
nor seek compensation. Instead， the landowners must do-
nate their land and money to the govemment to estab~民hthe
nondevelopable land for environmental protection.1)': 
Whn~ Taiwan's Constitution provides for propeロy
rights，山itsays nothing about expropriation. The Land Ex-
propriation Act of2000 fils that gap witl.1.the requirements 
and-methods of compulsory acquiSiIon. 154 Such takings are 
grouped into generalland， political， and zoning expropria-
tions. Generalland takings are for specific public needs such 
as national defense， infrastructure， environrnental protec-
tion，. govemment facilities， public education， and “otlト
ers."口コ Theonly qualification for these public needs is that 
govetnI)1ent or a govemment-assigned entity must operate 
them.口 oPoliticalland expropriation enables the state to ban 
private ownership of ce.r:.t!lin land， like that within a certain 
distance from the-coast， 157or that whi~h is beyond the maxi-
mum amount allowed to one owner.158 (This is in the law， 
but has never been practiced.) Lastly， govemment can ac-
quire land in a specified zone， in whC?l~ or in part， for 
planned development or improvements-159 
The p山posefor acquisition is almost always approved， 
with litle to no public comment. Unless the land is needed 
for an emergency， defense， transportation， water conserva-
tion， sanitation， or protection of the environment， the 
agency must first attempt to negotiate directly with the land-
own~~.^ Only if negotiations fail will the land be expropri-
ated-160Once public announcement of the appropriation is 
made， J.he landowner can make no changes to the land for 30 
days.山Thenegotiation can include relocation of any im-
provements found on the land an~Jeimbursement for im-
provements that cannot be moved. 162 Price is determined by 
the latest official land price set by the local govemm.~l)t to・
gether with replacement costs for any improvements. 10' The 
152. Based on the Ru1es for the Non-Urban Land Use Contro1， yet the Re-
gional Planning Law only authorizes the Ministry of the Interior to 
enact these rules by executive order. 
153. SeeTAlwAN CONST. a口.15(“the right of property shal be guaran-
ted to the peop1e"). 
154. See the 1930 Land Law，“Land Expropriation" chapter. See also 
Equalization ofLand Rights Act， Urban Planning Law， Encourage-
ment of the Upgrading of Industry Act， Science-Based Industrial 
Park Establishment and Management Act， and the Public Housing 
Act as further examples of expropriation clauses. 
155. See Land Expropriation Act art. 3. 
156. See id. art. 56. 
157. See id. art. 14. 
158. See id. arts. 28， 29. 
159. Id. art. 4. 
160. ld. art. 11. 
161. ld. art. 23. 
162. Id. art. 5. 
163. As expresly set forth in ArticJe 46 of the Eq凶lizationof Land 
Rights Act， the municipal or competent city/county government 
shal， for land within their precincts， survey也eupdates of1and price 
and evaluate the land prices from time ωtime and promulgate them 
on July 1 every year. The land prices so promu1gated by the munici-
pal orcompetent city /county govemment are “oficialand price lat-
govemment land prices relied upon for compensation often 
are below market prices， and public officials would be pU.l!: 
ished criminally for offering more than the official prices.1“ Indeeι出eLand Expropriation Act does not require market 
rates， WJ  and the govemment rates are set every July 1. 
Within 15 days after the expiration ofthe announcement，白e
proIl}9Jer of the new development must pay the compensa-
tion.IOO If payment is not made， the appropriation is invali-
dated， unless the lack of payment is because the landowner 
refuses to accept the pa戸nent，in which case the money will 
be deposited an~l!Y， and the compensation will stil be 
treated as received.167 Objections by neighbors and the land-
ownerωto the appropriation or the comp.~!1Sation amount 
wi1 be heard and are-allowed on appeaf168 
In the case of zone appropriation， maps ~凶t be filed for 
approval with the Minis住yof the Interior，'D'J and a能 cted
landowners can comment within 30 days. If landowners 
prefer， they can apply for a pe~~~ntage of offset land instead 
offull caslI for compensation.170 Available offset land is de-
fined by whatever is left over after the development is cOJ?:!: 
plete， and should be at least 40% ofthe appropriated land.171 
After the 0他 etland has been allocated， the rest of the un-
used land is design!lJ~d for such public facilities as roads， 
parks， and schools./': Any remaining land can be sold. 
While so many types oflegalland acquisition may make 
public undertakings simple， Taiwan relies heavily on the 
process without consistently protecting the right to private 
property. For example， in1997， Taiwan expropriated 2，275 
hectacres，.l!1d in 1999， the govemment expr~虫~ated 5，893 
hectacres.173 Proving need is easy for the state， r74 and consti-
tutional protection has become secondary at best. Other na-
tional acts uphold the Taiwanese Constitution， but are seem-
est promulgated by the government." Id. art. 46. See also id. ar包.30，
31，3，34. 
164. Artiele 131 ofthe Criminal Code provides that“[a] public oficial 
who， either directly or indirectly， seeks to profit from a function 
under his control or supervision shal be punished with impris・
onment for not les than one and not more than seven years; in 
addition thereto， a fine of not more than 7，000 Silver Dollar百
may be imposed." 
165. See Land Expropriation Act art. 30: 
For expropriated land， compensation shal be paid at the gov-
ernment-promulgated oficial prices ofthe curent term. . 
As necessary， anaditional percentage may be provided. The 
aditional percentage shal be proposed by the municipal or 
competent city/eounty government， in line with prices ofnor-
mal trading， tothe Land Price Evaluation Comrnission， 
which wil comeωa final decision on the grounds of the gov-
ernment・promulgatedoficial prices of the curent term. 
166. Id. arts. 17， 19，20. 
167. Id. art. 26. 
168. Id. art. 2. Objections can be heard by the municipal or city/county 
government， or through Adrninis住ativeAppeal Law and Adminis-
trative Litigation Law. Id. 
169. Id. art. 38. 
170. Id. art. 40. 
171. Id. art. 3. 
172. Id. art. 4. 
173. From statistics released by the Minis釘yof the Interior for the years 
1997・199.
174. About 50 years ago， Shih Shang-Kuan， a well-known e叩ertin Tai-
wanese law， said ofTaiwan's land expropriation methods:“Verysel-
dom can one find throughout legislation血eexpropriation pr.ωe・
dures as oversimplifiedas the L.and ~w of _our country." SHIH 
SHANG-KUAN， THE THEORY OF LAND LAW 522 (1951). 
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ingly ignored.175 When the federal governrnent is looking 
for land to appropriate， landowners， local governrnent agen-
cies， and other affected landowners get litle to no chance to 
speak. As a resu1t， until recently， almost allland appropria-
tion applications have been approved. 
Thailand 
Thailand has divided its land use planning into multiple lev-
els， beginning with a five-year National Economic and So-
cial Development Plan. The Plan determines the national 
framework， by providing guidelines for land use planning at 
the regional， provincial， and district levels， as well邸 for
town plans. The問 fore，al of the regional， provincial， dis-
出ct， and town plans are ωsome extent consistent with one 
another. Thailand 's rapidly expanding population under-
mines its series ofspecific planning laws， especially con-
servation ones， which are not strictly enforced. While the 
Town Planning Act of 1975 was to control urban land use 
through zoning， it has not been effective even though it 
has been amended twice. People buying agricu1turally 
zoned land have convet1~9 it to nonagricu1tural l;l!，~s to 
make it more pmfltable，176with no repercussions-177Ag-
ricu1turallanct takes precedence over' forests， 178 the den-
sity of urban centers cOl1!!nues to increase， and the pres-
sures for land increase.179 
The C.<:?!1Stitution of Thailand includes rights to privat怠
proper担180and to ∞mpensation for conditionalland acqui-
sition.101 The Thai Constitution gives the governrnent the 
rightto∞mpulsory acquisition， but ~~y if a specific law al-
lows acquisltion for a specific use.182 Acquisition must be 
for the public good， and compensatiq!l_ must be fair and paid 
within a reasonable period of time.183 
Several specific laws allow for the acquisition of prop-
e託y.The Immovable Property Acq凶sitionAct of 1987 al-
lows the state to expropria旬問ales飽teproperty， and other 
legislation specifically allows for acquisition of property ~q~ 
such things as airports，railways，highwayB，and industry-184 
175. Land Law art. 208 ('‘The land expropriatぬnshal be limitedωthe 
scope only as indispensable ωpromotion ofth虐 undertaking");En-
forcement Rules of Land Law art. 49 (“Land expropriation shal be 
caried out within the scope， not against the expropriation objectives 
at由leleast posible damage."). 
176日Accordingto the Ofice of Agricultural Economics ofthe Ministry 
of Agriculture and Cooperatives， between 1986 and 1988， the main 
rice production 時 ion(central陀gion)lost much of its agricultural 
land ωr官sidential，commercial， and industrial ar官as.
17. No laws presently prohibit land subdivisions. 
178. See Ofice of Agricultural Economics， Number of Agricultural 
Households and Avera伊 FarmSize Between 1981・195.Average 
farm sizes have ∞ntinuedωshri 
Agencies follow a series of steps toward acquisition，合om
requesting白atthe property be donated， tonegotiation for 
sale， toissuing a royal decree or announcing the Immovable 
Property Act to cover that specific piece of property. Com-
pensation then entails the governrnent's valuation of the 
landandits出 sets，damage to properties， demolition costs of 
any immovable properties， labor and material costs， incon-
venience， and a computation ofthe value ofthe land prior to 
acquisition versus prosQ~ctive value. Negotiation ensues， 
with appeals available. f85 
Because ofrising competition for land， negotiations often 
break down， which can cause endless delays， because the 
executing agency can only take over the property when the 
compensation has been completely paid. The appropriation 
process lacks efficiency， inter alia， because of public pro・
tests， obstructions to ggvernrnent projects， and lack of com-
pensation eq凶 tions.100The lack offormulaic methods also 
means出atmany experience long delays in receiving their 
compensation， making landowners les likely to cooperate， 
and extending the appeals process. Because it takes so long 
to acquire the amount of needed land， public works projects 
often take 20 years to complete， letting some appropriated 
land lie unused the entire time. Thailand， like Malaysia， is 
considering 位Y.Î~I}g the concept of land readjustment， as is 
done in Japan:187-but whether that will help the efficiency 
problem and land-utilization back10g remains to be seen. 
United States 
Land use controls in the United States are generally exer-
cised at the local govemment leve1. The most effective of 
thesecon仕olsis zoning， which is used by local governrnents 
to divide regions into use dis凶cts.Statutes pen凶tlocal 
governrnents to divide their jurj~ftictions into zones with 
pennitted凶 esand res仕ictions.18Another localland use 
method that has gained popularity is the subdivision pro-
cess， which requires an area of1and to be completely pla“.ed 
and those plats to be approved before lots can be sold to indi-
viduals， who will develop their lot according to the ap-
proved plat. Subdivisions must include plans for their own 
infrastructures and public facilities， as well出 dedicating
open spaces and public ~1:lildings， th凶 managinglocal 
growth-and expenditures.189 In the same vein， developers 
must often pay impact fees to the community白atprovides 
the subdivision with such public facilities as sewers and 
roa也， both on-site and off-site， but only if the improve-
men~~9an be found to be required because of the subdivi-
sion.190 Building (prospective) and housing (re位oactive)
185. See Immovable Property Acquisition Act， ~~9， 10，23，25 (cl. 2)， 
and 28. 
186. Communication from Justice Prapant Subsaeng ofthe Thailand Su-
preme Court (undated; on file with authors). 
187. This method of the govemment trading land for land potentialy 
could πduce the state's costs. No legislation specificaly suports 
血econcept yet， and it is only being run on a甘ialbasis. 
18. A model Standard Zoning Enabling Act合'om1923， drafted by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce， usualy forms the basis for the 
state statutes. 
189. SeeERlcDAMIANKELLY，MANAGINGCOMMUNITYGROW1H:POL-
ITICS， TECHNIQUES， AND IMPAcTS 16 (193). 
190. David L. Calies， Impact Fees. Exactions. and Payingfor Growth in 
Hawaii， 1U. HAW. L. REV. 295 (1989); Brian W. Blaeser & 
Christine M. Kentopp， Impact Fees:・TheSecond Generation， 38 
WASH. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 5 (190); Julian C. Juergensmeyer， 
Funding I，!向structur宮:Paying the Costs of Growth Through Im-
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codes list minimum standards for the health， safety， and wel-
fare of the public. 
Some states have reclaimed their land use control191 
through regional192 or statewide193 zoning and planning. 
Often this is to protect a resource an~Jo control develop-
ments that impact an entire region.194 Also， the federal 
government has overriOing statute~ ~，!nd implementing reg-
~latio~~Jor clean air195 and water， 196for nianag~!1..g coastal 
zones， 197and for protecting known flood zones~19g六Regula­
tions that leave a landowner without economically benefi-
cial use require compensation as ifthe land were compul-
sorily purchased. Regulations that deprive a landowner of 
some， but not al economic use， may require compensation， 
depending upon such factors as the investment-backed ex-
pectations of the landowner and the character of the gov-
ernmental action. 
As with land use controls， local， state， and federal govern-
ments al have the power to acquire land by compulsory pur-
chase. The U.S. Constitution limits this ability， however， by 
requiring that such a taking must be for a public use， and the 
pact Fees and Other Land Regulation Charges， LINCOLN INST. OF 
LAND POL'y MONOGRAPH，Feb. 1985， at 85・5;EXACflONS， IMPAcT 
FEES， AND DEDICATIONS (Robert FrelJich & Oavid W. Bushek eds.， 
195). 
191. See FRED P. BOSSELMAN & DAVID L. CALLIES， THE QUJETREVO-
LUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971); ROBERT HEALY & JOHN 
ROSENBERG， LAND USE AND THE STATES (1979); THOMAS G. PEL-
HAM， STATE LAND USE PLANNING AND REGULATION (1979); JOHN 
M. DEGRovE， LAND， GROWTH， AND POLmcs (1984). 
192. For discusions ofthese systems and the“takings" cases challenging 
them， se BOSSELMAN & CALLIES， supra note 191; DEGROVE: su-
pra note 191; and FRED P. BOSSELMAN ET AL.， THE T AKING IssuE 
(1973). 
193. Forexample， Florida， Hawaii， Oregon， and Vermont. See KELLY， su-
pra note 189; J. BARRY CULLINGWORTH， PLANNING IN四 EU.S.A. 
(197). 
194. For a general overview， in Japanese， se DAVID L. CALLIES， LAND 
USE CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES (Makitaro Hotta回 ns.，
1994). See also for various analyses of land use law， DAVID L. 
CALLIES， PRESERVING PARADISE: WHY REGULATIONS WON'T 
WORK (194); DAVID L. CALLIES， REGULA百NGPARADISE: LAND 
USECON冗 OLSIN HAWAJI (1984); BOSSELMAN & CALLIES， supra 
no旬 191;DANIEL R. MANDELKER， ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND 
CONTROLS LEGISLATlON (1976 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter 
MANDELKER， LAND CONTROLS]; PHYLLIS MEYERS， ZoNING HA-
WAJI (1976); Oavid L. Calies， Land Use Control in an Island State， 2 
τ冶IRDWORLD PLAN. REV. 187 (1980); Oavid L. Calies， Land Use， 
2 U. HAW. L. REV. 167 (1979); Tom Oinel， Land Use Zoning in a 
Developing State， 2 THIRD WORLD PLAN. REv. 195 (1980); Oaniel 
R Mandelker & Annette Kolis， Whither Hawaii? Land Use Man-
agement in an Island State， 1 U. HAW. L. REV. 48 (1979); DANIEL 
R. MANDELKER， LAND USE LAW (4th ed. 1997 & Supp. 20∞); 
JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS， LAND USE 
PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW (199); STA花 ANDREGlONAL 
COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING (Peter A. Buchsbaum & Lary J. Srnith 
eds.， 193). 
195. Clean Air Act， 42 U.S.C. ~~7401 ・7671q， ELR STAT. CAA 
UlOl・618.
196. Clean Water Act， 3 U.S.C. ~~1251 ・\387， ELR STAT. FWPCA 
~~101・607.
197. See Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972， 16 U.S.C. 
~~1451・ 1465， ELR STAT. CZMA ~~302-319. For general descrip-
tion and comm~nts， se Sarah Chassis， The Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act， 46 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 145 (1980); Gilbert Finel， 
Coastal Zone Management: An Introduction， 1978 AM. B. FOUND. 
RES. J. 153; FRED P. BOSSELMAN ET AL.， FEDERAL LAND USE 
REGULATION (197); NATURAL RESOURCES DEFE 
private owner must be justly compensated.l99 Compensa-
tion is generally calculated for the value of the land and its 
present improvements (orthe loss ofvalue， depending upon 
the kind oftaking involved) at the time ofthe confiscation， 
with no consideration given t<Ltte白同reworth of the prop-
erty after its confiscated useFOVarious local government 
authorities have th_~.right to cC>1}demn private land f<?~_such 
things as housing，201airports，202convention centers，203and 
other public purpose pr吋ecω.Public utility corporations 
may also acquire land through compulsory purchase be-
cause of their quasi-public functions. To allow for taking 
immediate possession and use of a condemned property， 
quick take provisions often require the condemnor to pay a 
deposit of sorts ~~th the court， which then orders surrender 
oUhe property.204 
A non-negotiable condemnation action凶国lybegins 
with an agency filing a complaint in COurt.205 The compiaint 
must include the g<?y~rnment's plans for the land and a spe・
cific mapping of it. 206 The court"summons al interested par・
ties to decide on a fair price and to veri命thatthe govern-
ment will use the land as claimed. 
Most federal agencies try to negotiate ".:!t landowners 
during the process of compulsory pUrchase.207 The property 
is appraised， with the owner able to comment on various val-
ues血atmay not be readily apparent. The sales records of 
comparable properties are checked; replacement costs， loss 
ofbusiness， and the fate oftenants are al considered in the 
compensation process. Often not considered are such things 
as business goodwill， loss of白turebusiness， frus住ationof 
plans， and costs of removing buil~tngs or fix加res，unless 
specifiedlyprovidedinthe statuteF8OnceanoEerismade， 
the owner can agree， orcondemnation proceedings may be-
gin in court. 
Not only must the landowner be fairly compensated for 
the highest an<!T.est use ofthe land， but he must also be given 
“due process"2ω: fa!~ ~notice of the government's intent "t~ 
acq凶re出epropertyμU and a day in court ifhe so desires.":lI 
In California， for example， ifa landowner can prove that the 
particular agency does not possess appropriate compulsory 
p町 chasepower， that the proposed use will not be public， 
that the property will be used for a different purpose， that the 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For an overview of erninent domain in the 
United States， se the newsleter JUST COMPENSATION (Gideon 
Kanner ed.， 1974). 
200. See， e.g.， HAW. REV. STAT. ~101-24 (2α)(). 
201. The Hawaii Housing Authority is an example. HAW. REV. STAT. 
~356・ 18.
202. See， e.g.，血eAi巾俳句Oivisionofthe U.S. Department ofTranspor.・
匂討on;HAW. REV. STAT. ~261-4(b). 
203. See， e.g.， the Convention Center Authority; HAW. REV. STAT. 
~208X et seq. 
204. Id. See Title I of the federal Uniform Relocation Asis包nceand 
Real Property Acquisition Act of 1970， 42 U.S.C. ~4604. 
205. See， e.g.， HAW. REV. STAT. ~1Oト 15.
206. See， e.g.， HAW. REV. STAT. ~101・ 16.
207. See supra note 204. 
208. 1 MCQUILLIN， MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS ~32.92 to 32.92c 
(2α)(). 
209. The right of due proces， like ∞mpens副00， derives from the U.S. 
Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
210. See In re South Oakota Wa旬rMgmt. Bd. Approving Wa町 Permit
No. 1791・2，351N.W.2d 19， 123 (S.O. 1984). 
211. Id. See also Weiner v. Nebraska Oep't of Rds.， 137 N.W.2d 852 
(Neb. 1965). 
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property will not be used within a set amount of time， that 
the prope円yis not subject to compulsory purchase for that 
pu中ose，or any other gr9.l!nd provided by law， the land-
owner can keep his land.212 The governrnent must also be 
careful not to take more land出anit needs， and to avoid so 
publicizing its eventual condernnation that it lowers the 
212. Santa Cruz County Redeve10pment Agency v. Izant， 37 Cal. Rptr. 
4出 141(1995). 
value ofthe to-be-condernned land. Sometimes the gove~: 
ment can prove the necessity for excess condernnation， ~I~ 
but if it ever abandons the use for which the land was ini-
tialy condernned， statutes often require that property to be 
resold to the original condernnee. 
213. David L. Callies et al.，均/ueCapture Policy， 42 PLAN. 22 (1976); 2 
PHILIP NICHOLS， THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN ~7.516 (問v.ed.
1997). 
